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Humans are especially good at taking another’s perspective—representing
what others might be thinking or experiencing. This “mentalizing”
capacity is apparent in everyday human interactions and conversa-
tions. We investigated its neural basis using magnetoencephalogra-
phy. We focused on whether mentalizing was engaged spontaneously
and routinely to understand an utterance’s meaning or largely on-
demand, to restore “common ground” when expectations were vio-
lated. Participants conversed with 1 of 2 confederate speakers and
established tacit agreements about objects’ names. In a subsequent
“test” phase, some of these agreements were violated by either the
same or a different speaker. Our analysis of the neural processing of
test phase utterances revealed recruitment of neural circuits asso-
ciated with language (temporal cortex), episodic memory (e.g., medial
temporal lobe), and mentalizing (temporo-parietal junction and ventro-
medial prefrontal cortex). Theta oscillations (3–7 Hz) were modulated
most prominently, and we observed phase coupling between function-
ally distinct neural circuits. The episodic memory and language cir-
cuits were recruited in anticipation of upcoming referring expressions,
suggesting that context-sensitive predictions were spontaneously
generated. In contrast, the mentalizing areas were recruited on-demand,
as a means for detecting and resolving perceived pragmatic anomal-
ies, with little evidence they were activated to make partner-speciﬁc
predictions about upcoming linguistic utterances.
Keywords: conversational interaction, episodic working memory,
magnetoencephalography, perspective taking, pragmatics, theory of mind
Introduction
In conversation, the meaning of linguistic expressions such as
“the red couch” is often ambiguous, such that interlocutors
need to work together to make sure their interpretations are
aligned (Pickering and Garrod 2004). One inﬂuential proposal
assumes that interlocutors align their interpretations by pro-
cessing language against their “common ground,” the set of
mutual beliefs and expectations that are shared, and critically,
“known to be shared” with their interlocutors (Lewis 1979;
Clark and Marshall 1981; Stalnaker 1987). This collaborative
model of conversation assumes that the memory representa-
tions forming the common ground are built up through a
process of “grounding” (Clark and Brennan 1991). Processing
language consistently with common ground involves accessing
representations that are known to be shared, and suppressing
information known privately to oneself.
The process of inferring another’s mental states, or “menta-
lizing” (e.g., Frith and Frith 2006) is likely to be involved not
only in establishing common ground representations but also
in selectively accessing and maintaining such representations
in a context-sensitive manner. Language users cannot always
count on others having the same perceptual states and experi-
ences and so must on occasion modulate what information
they use in speaking and understanding to be consistent with
what they know about their interlocutor. Behavioral evidence
suggests that during conversation, mentalizing is often called
upon for resolving referential ambiguity, especially in cases in
which there are clear differences in perspective (Keysar et al.
2003; Kronmüller and Barr 2007).
Given the inherent ambiguity of language, mentalizing
would seem to be an essential ingredient of successful commu-
nication (Metzing and Brennan 2003; Kronmüller and Barr
2007). However, research over the past several decades indi-
cates that mentalizing is effortful (Roβnagel 2000; Nilsen and
Graham 2009; Lin et al. 2010) and that language users have
access to other strategies for resolving ambiguity that do not
involve mentalizing (Ferreira and Dell 2000; Pickering and
Garrod 2004; Shintel and Keysar 2007; Barr 2014).
One case that is relevant to the current investigation con-
cerns how basic memory processes activate contextually rele-
vant information during conversational language processing.
During interaction, the perceptual experiences associated with
hearing and seeing a particular interlocutor will tend to
increase the accessibility of information in long-term memory
that is associated with that interlocutor; in this way, basic
memory mechanisms promote contextually appropriate speak-
ing and understanding. However, the episodic representations
that are forged through conversational interaction are not iden-
tical to common ground, as episodic representations can be
shared without also being known to be shared (Shintel and
Keysar 2007). Furthermore, contextually appropriate represen-
tations may become activated in a contextually appropriate
manner via the basic memory retrieval principle of encoding
speciﬁcity rather than through mentalizing (Barr et al. 2014).
Supporting this view, a recent study shows that when a speaker
articulates an utterance designed by another speaker (e.g.,
reading someone else’s email aloud), listeners activate infor-
mation associated with the person delivering the message (the
messenger/reader) rather than with the person who designed
it, despite the relevant common ground being that which is
shared with the utterance designer (Barr et al. 2014).
In short, because processes other than mentalizing can
promote successful communication, in any given case in which
language users adapt their language processing to context, it is
an empirical question whether or not such adaptation involved
mentalizing as an indicator of genuine partner-oriented pro-
cessing. Our study therefore set out to investigate these questions
using magnetoencephalography (MEG) to monitor listeners′
unfolding interpretations of referentially ambiguous expres-
sions during live social interaction: We tested whether men-
talizing would occupy a central, anticipatory role or a more
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“on demand” role within common ground processing, which
has been of some debate recently (e.g., Metzing and Brennan
2003; Kronmüller and Barr 2007). MEG is well suited to the
study of spoken language processing in context, because it
provides the necessary temporal and spectral resolution to
examine moment-by-moment changes in activation and modu-
lation of neural oscillations, as well as sufﬁcient spatial reso-
lution to enable localization of function and the identiﬁcation
of brain networks.
Previous neuroimaging studies have addressed issues of ref-
erential ambiguity, memory, and mentalizing, but usually these
issues are addressed separately in different studies, often in
non-conversational settings with socially isolated participants.
While EEG studies have documented a remarkably early sensi-
tivity to referential ambiguity ("NRef" effect; Van Berkum et al.
1999; Van Berkum et al. 2003), it remains unclear whether
such effects can be modulated by conversational memory or by
beliefs about common ground, as participants in these studies
were presented with prepared text or speech in social isola-
tion. An fMRI study of communicative perspective taking
reported activations related to referential ambiguity in the su-
perior dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, bilateral middle tem-
poral gyri, and the left temporal pole, whereas activations in
the left precuneus and bilateral temporo-parietal junctions
(TPJs) particularly reﬂected the presence vs. absence of an
avatar during referential instructions (Dumontheil et al. 2010).
However, this study used artiﬁcial avatars and did not involve
interaction with live partners.
Other fMRI and lesion studies have identiﬁed regions of the
brain that are likely to be responsible for building and/or main-
taining representations of others′ beliefs and goals, including
right-hemisphere structures in temporo-parietal areas such as
the posterior temporal sulcus (pSTS) and the TPJ, in addition to
certain medial (Saxe and Wexler 2005; Saxe and Powell 2006;
Van Overwalle and Baetens 2009, for review) and especially
ventromedial (e.g., Gregory et al. 2002; Atique et al. 2011) pre-
frontal areas. A recent study showed that these same regions
may be involved in generating and inferring communicative in-
tentions during live nonlinguistic communication (Noordzij
et al. 2009). This is consistent with other recent studies that
used relatively realistic social interaction (for review, see Hari
and Kujala 2009) and which have shown increased activation in
social cognition and reward brain areas (Redcay et al. 2010). In
sum, although we have learned much about the various brain
systems involved in processing referential ambiguity and in
mentalizing, there is still little understanding of when, and how
extensively, mentalizing networks might be activated when
participating in realistic conversational interaction.
The absence of neuroimaging studies on conversational lan-
guage processing reﬂects the existence of a number of technical
and logistical challenges that have imposed a barrier to this kind
of research. First, the required signal-to-noise ratio for neuroi-
maging data analysis typically necessitates a larger number of
trials compared with behavioral studies, as well as a high level
of control over the stimuli and stimuli presentation timings, in
order to reduce any additional sources of variability. This need
for large numbers of highly controlled trials is at odds with the
characteristics of naturalistic interaction with live conversational
partners, where it is difﬁcult to predict what speakers will say
and when they will say it. Furthermore, identifying the brain
networks involved in the processing of conversational speech
requires a neuroimaging technique that provides adequate
spatial and temporal resolution. We surmounted these obstacles
by using MEG with a novel communication-game paradigm
“do-I-see-what-you-mean?” (see Fig. 1, Panel A) that enabled
spontaneous, quasi-naturalistic conversation with trained con-
federates, but which still allowed us full control over stimulus
characteristics and timing through interleaving prerecorded
speech with live speech. Critically, we implemented this inter-
leaving in a way that would lead participants to believe that they
were experiencing a live interaction including only spontan-
eously produced speech by real participants.
The experiment alternated between blocks of trials com-
prising a "grounding" phase, characterized by spontaneous
interaction between the participant and 1 of 2 confederate
speakers, followed by a testing phase in which participants
heard speech from 1 of the 2 speakers that was (unbeknownst
to them) prerecorded and not produced live. During interactive
grounding phases (n = 42 of interactions in each phase), parti-
cipants built up temporary referring precedents (e.g., agree-
ments to call a particular object a “couch”; see Brennan and
Clark 1996) through live interaction with 1 of the 2 confederate
speakers (1 male and 1 female) regarding how images pre-
sented on separate screens were to be named (Fig. 1, Panel A,
left and middle panel). On trials of the subsequent test phase
(n = 26 of trials in each phase), both the participant and the
confederate speaker allegedly saw 1 object on their respective
screens (Fig. 1, Panel A, right panel). In critical "precedent mis-
match" trials, the participant saw a target object from the inter-
active grounding phase and then heard either the same or the
other (confederate) speaker name their own object (prere-
corded speech), but using a different (mismatching) term from
the one established for the target object during grounding
(e.g., using the term “sofa” rather than the established term
“couch” to refer to an object; Fig. 1, Panel A, right, top panel).
Based on the description the speaker chose, the participant
had to decide whether or not the speaker was looking at the
same object.
In short, we manipulated 2 factors during the critical test-
phase trials (in relation to the grounding phase): Firstly, we
manipulated whether the same or different (confederate)
speaker would name the test pictures (blocked per test phase),
and secondly, we manipulated (1) whether the current naming
did not match a previously established precedent or (2)
whether no precedent had been established at all. That is, in
some grounding trials, objects had been referred to by their
location (e.g., “top left”), potentially generating interactive
memory traces for that object, yet without a naming precedent
(see Fig. 1, Panel A, right, middle panel). These “no precedent”
trials served as baseline conditions for the same- and different-
speaker conditions, respectively. Additionally, "precedent
match" ﬁller trials (and a number of other catch trials) were
added as well to each test phase to ensure that participants
would not learn to expect a precedent mismatch on a majority
of trials (see Fig. 1, Panel A, right, bottom panel; see also Mate-
rials for detailed information).
Importantly, a speaker might use a new (mismatching) term
for different reasons. The possibility that the speaker might be
gazing at a different object provided a cooperative reason why
the same speaker, who set up the precedent in the ﬁrst phase,
might use a new term; they might want to indicate that
they now see a different picture than before. This could be in-
ferred via mentalizing. In contrast, if a different speaker had
established the precedent, the current speaker might simply
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have different preferences for naming things, so in that case, it
is more probable that the speaker is looking at the same
picture as the participant. The task made it important for listen-
ers to keep track of who said what, because whether the name
they hear is a match or a mismatch (by the same or a different
speaker) provides relevant information for deciding whether
the speaker sees the same or a different picture. It is important
to note that listeners were informed before each phase of test
trials whether or not they would hear the same speaker as in
the preceding interactive phase or the other speaker. This
allowed for consistent person-speciﬁc retrieval of previous in-
teractions and possibly anticipation of the speaker’s intentions.
Different predictions can be made for the different condi-
tions about the activation time-course of functional neurocog-
nitive networks. It is important to point out, however, that in
order to separate the various functional networks and their
activation dynamics, we had to rely on the substantial body
of previous neuroimaging research about how brain areas
relate to function. Thus, the functional separations of episodic
memory, language, and mentalizing networks we propose
here have to be understood as well-founded, yet hypothetical
assertions. Before ﬂeshing out the crucial hypotheses about
the time-course of mentalizing, we spell out speciﬁc predic-
tions about the time-course of activation of memory and lan-
guage networks. These predictions are rather independent of
the different views regarding the anticipatory vs. “on-demand”
role of mentalizing but also relate to speaker-speciﬁc common
ground vs. more generic speaker-independent processing.
First, the visual stimulus would elicit retrieval of any existing
precedents (e.g., couch), if present, before hearing any speech,
simply on the basis of the episodic memory of the previous
interaction (e.g., Baddeley 2000). Such situated multimodal
episodic short- and long-term representations have been asso-
ciated with medial temporal lobe function (e.g., Squire and
Zolamorgan 1991; Olson et al. 2006), allowing viewpoint-
dependent retrieval of an object in its visuo-spatial context
(e.g., Schmidt et al. 2007; Sulpizio et al. 2013), including the
“negotiated” name for the object (e.g., Duff and Brown-
Schmidt 2012 for review), along with the identity of the
speaker (Imaizumi et al. 1997). Because listeners knew in
advance of each test phase which speaker would be speaking,
we expected stronger retrieval of the precedent in the same-
Figure 1. Panel A: Design and example displays and speech in the interactive (left) and test (right) phases. Stimuli were presented in color during the experiment. The speaker’s
view was implied by the speaker’s behavior without being seen by the participant and is presented here for clarity. Physical stimuli in the test phase were identical for the 4
experimental conditions (same-/different-speaker precedent match/no precedent) over participants, but test trials were never repeated within a single participant. Panel B:
Visualization of predictions from the anticipatory and “on-demand” view of mentalizing about which areas are expected to be more active in the same-speaker precedent mismatch
than the other conditions during different parts of the test phase.
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speaker condition (i.e., speaker identity serving as a further re-
trieval cue). This could be reﬂected by differential activation in
the middle temporal lobe (e.g., Imaizumi et al. 1997; Olsen et al.
2009) and the temporal poles (Imaizumi et al. 1997), that is, stron-
ger anticipatory episodic retrieval, in conjunction with executive
function areas in lateral prefrontal cortex (Sakai and Passingham
2004; Kessler and Kiefer 2005). Importantly, episodic retrieval
may lead to anticipation of a speciﬁc linguistic expression in the
right temporal lobe, which has been proposed in conjunction
with right lateral prefrontal cortex (Tourville and Guenther 2011)
as a locus for linguistic predictions and integration based on prag-
matic (e.g., Gardner et al. 1983; Federmeier 2007) and/or visual
episodic context (e.g., Marini et al. 2005). Such activations related
to memory retrieval would be elicited by viewing the picture, so
they can occur from the moment that the picture is presented but
will probably be on-going throughout the trial. Furthermore,
such activations would indeed reﬂect speaker-speciﬁc rather than
generic speaker-independent memory processing. However, this
fulﬁlls a necessary but not a sufﬁcient condition for evidencing
the engagement of common ground. As pointed out earlier, it
could merely reﬂect context-speciﬁc encoding and retrieval of re-
presentations that are shared without being known to be shared.
Mentalizing processes, in contrast, would be a more genuine indi-
cator of common ground use.
With regards to hypotheses concerning the involvement of
mentalizing, previous research supports a prediction of greater
involvement in the condition where the same speaker fails to
match an established precedent, as this is the situation in
which common ground is apparently violated (Metzing and
Brennan 2003; Kronmüller and Barr 2007). In contrast, situa-
tions where no precedent had been established or where a dif-
ferent speaker fails to match a precedent would require
corrective mentalizing to a much lesser degree (if at all). Thus,
observing the strongest mentalizing brain network activation
in the same-speaker, precedent mismatch condition would cor-
roborate the general view that participants make use of common
ground processing for resolving referential ambiguity in the
current paradigm. To distinguish between an anticipatory vs. an
“on-demand” view of mentalizing in common ground processing,
we need to establish when mentalizing is engaged in relation to
language processing (see Fig. 1, Panel B). Are perspective-taking
processes spontaneously engaged prior to an anticipated commu-
nicative event, in the service of generating expectations about
what a speaker might say and how she might say it? Alternatively,
are they mostly engaged "on demand" after the listener suspects
communication failure and makes a conscious effort to re-
establish common ground? We therefore examined the timing
of activation of mentalizing networks, typically associated with
the TPJ, precuneus (PC), and the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC, e.g., Gregory et al. 2002; Van Overwalle and
Baetens 2009; Atique et al. 2011) to understand the extent to
which these mentalizing networks are activated prior to
naming by the same speaker or, in contrast, only in response
to a precedent mismatch produced by the same speaker.
The patterns of activation timing, co-activation, and oscillatory
coupling between distinct brain modules provided us with un-
precedented detail about processes of human communicative
interaction and further allowed us to disentangle a more partner-
orientated from amore egocentric conception of interactive com-
munication. However, wewould like to re-iterate that the current
segregation between functional brain modules is hypothetical
(reverse inference), as it relies on previous neuroimaging
research for linking brain areas to function. Our results must
therefore be regarded as provisional, requiring further testing
and conﬁrmation by subsequent research.
Materials and Methods
Participants
We obtained MEG data from 16 British participants (8 males), all of
whom reported speaking English as their native language. They were
recruited from the participant pool of the psychology department of
Glasgow University, were paid £6 per hour for their participation, and
gave their informed consent. Data from an additional female partici-
pant were excluded because she clicked on the wrong picture too
often (22 times) in the interactive phase (see Procedure).
Materials
We gathered 320 pictures (from the Internet) that were given 2 plaus-
ible names in an informal pilot as the experimental pictures (see
Table 1
Overview and examples of the experimental and ﬁller items used
Items Number Interactive
phase
Test phase Example picture
Experimental precedent
mismatch
160 Sofa Couch
Experimental no
precedent
160 Top right (e.g.) Flame
Precedent match ﬁllers 80 Pear Pear
Category ﬁllers (pairs) 20 Musical
instrument
absent
absent Musical
instrument
New correct ﬁllers 40 absent Phone
New incorrect ﬁllers 60 absent Glass
Pure ﬁllers 420 not named absent
Note: See Materials for descriptions of the types of items. Example pictures (last row) are
presented in black and white but were presented to participants in color. The third and fourth
columns indicate how the picture was referred to in the respective phases (if the picture was
absent or not named in one of the phases, this is indicated in italics). Experimental items are
presented in the ﬁrst 2 rows and the different ﬁller categories in the last 5 rows.
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Table 1 for examples). The 2 names for the experimental pictures were
selected to be as balanced as possible. The more dominant name was
always used the ﬁrst time the object was named (in the interaction
phase, see below). This was done to preclude the explanation that the
speaker had thought of a better way to name the picture. We selected
640 other pictures as ﬁller items that were given a name that was
clearly dominant in the informal pilot. These pictures were used for 5
different categories of ﬁllers. First, to make sure that not all pictures
that were seen in the interactive phase were named differently in the
subsequent test phase, we used precedent match ﬁllers (Table 1, third
row). We used 80 pictures to appear twice in the interactive phase and
once (with the same name) in the following test phase. Second, in
order to demonstrate to participants that different pictures could be
named in the same way in the 2 different phases, we added the "cat-
egory ﬁller" condition (20 pairs of pictures, Table 1, fourth row) with 2
different pictures from the same category (e.g., piano and violin), 1 ap-
pearing in the interactive phase and 1 in the subsequent test phase,
which were both named by their superordinate term (e.g., musical in-
strument). Furthermore, 100 pictures only appeared in the test phase,
40 of which were named correctly ("new correct ﬁllers," Table 1, ﬁfth
row), and the other 60 were named incorrectly ("new incorrect ﬁllers,"
Table 1, sixth row). The names used in the incorrect ﬁller condition
were related to the real names for the pictures (e.g., jar—glass) so that
participants needed to pay attention to spot subtle differences. Next to
that, 420 pictures were used as "pure ﬁllers" (Table 1, bottom row).
These appeared once in the interactive phase but were never named.
The names for the test phase (see Procedure) were recorded,
divided equally between the 2 confederates. Some of the ﬁller (but no
experimental) names were recorded with a hesitation, to make partici-
pants believe the pictures were named on the spot.
Procedure
Participants were ﬁrst prepared for the MEG. HPI coils were attached
to the participant’s head behind the right and left ears, above the
nasion, and on the right- and the left-hand side of the forehead. The
coil positions and head shape were digitized before the scan using
the Polhemus program and stylus (Polhemus Isotrak, Kaiser Aerospace,
Inc.). Digitization is standardly used and allows to determine the head
position in the MEG at the start and end of each block (maximum
movement tolerated was 0.5 cm) and enables co-registration with the
structural MRI for later source localization. Those participants that did
not have a structural MRI were scanned after the experiment using a 3T
Siemens Trio MRI (Siemens Medical Solutions). Preparation took about
45 min on average, during which the experimenter collected the con-
federates (instructed fourth-year psychology students, 1 female and 1
male) and introduced them to the participant. Participants were told
that these 2 speakers would interact with them via a microphone from
separate rooms. After 2 practice blocks, in which participants experi-
enced the role of both listener and speaker, they were presented with 5
20-min runs consisting of 4 blocks each. The order of blocks was ran-
domized per participant. Each block consisted of an interactive phase
followed by a test phase. The speaker for each phase was always an-
nounced before the start of the phase and remained the same through-
out the phase.
In an interactive phase, the speaker/confederate (following a script)
asked the participant to click on pictures on the screen using an optical
track ball. Participants were told they could interact with the speaker
and ask questions. Participants always saw 9 pictures on the screen
(see Fig. 1, Panel A, middle), and speakers were allegedly seeing the
same stimuli and had to name those pictures marked by a red frame
(see Fig. 1, Panel A, left). The speaker/confederate indicated most pic-
tures by their name, but some by their location (e.g., “bottom right”).
In the latter case, pictures in the marked location allegedly were ob-
scured from the speakers view (see, e.g., Fig. 1, Panel A, left panel,
bottom right picture). In each interactive phase, the speaker/confeder-
ate named 13 pictures twice in exactly the same way (later serving as
precedent mismatch trials or as precedent match ﬁllers) and 8 pictures
twice by their location (later serving as no precedent trials).
In the test phases, the speaker/confederate was the same as for the
preceding interactive phase in half of the cases and different in the
other half. The participant saw only 1 picture at a time on the screen
(see Fig. 1, Panel A, right). The speaker/confederate allegedly also saw
only a single picture and named that picture (e.g., “sofa”). Participants
were asked to indicate whether the speaker’s picture was the same as or
different from their own, using their dominant hand on the trackball
(thumb for same picture and ring ﬁnger for different picture). They
were not allowed to talk to the speaker. In reality, all utterances of the
speaker/confederate in the test phase were recorded beforehand. Each
trial started with a ﬁxation cross in the middle of the screen, followed
by presentation of the picture at the same location. In experimental
trials (precedent mismatch or no precedent), the picture was always
presented for 800 ms before the recorded name was played and stayed
on the screen until a response was given. For ﬁller trials, the preview
interval before presentation of the name was varied. Each test phase
started with 2 ﬁller trials, followed by a random presentation of 8 prece-
dent mismatch trials (named differently than in the interactive phase), 8
no precedent trials (indicated by their location in the interactive phase),
4 precedent match ﬁllers (named the same as in the interactive phase),
and 4 other ﬁllers (see Materials and Table 1). Note that the physical
stimuli in the test phasewere identical for the 4 experimental conditions
over participants, but items were not repeated within a participant. The
different conditions were created by changing the speaker and the par-
ticular reference to this picture in the preceding interactive phase. Each
experimental condition (same-speaker precedent mismatch; same-
speaker no precedent; different-speaker precedent mismatch; different-
speaker no precedent) occurred 80 times throughout the experiment.
Apparatus
MEG data were acquired using a 248-channel (or SQUIDs; supercon-
ducting quantum interference devices) whole head magnetometer
(4D-Neuroimaging Magnes 3600 WH system) at the CCNi at the Univer-
sity of Glasgow, sampled at 508.63 Hz and band-pass ﬁltered between
0.1 and 200 Hz. Trigger pulses via the parallel port were used to syn-
chronize MEG data acquisition with experimental events. A Panasonic
3-chip DLP projector (PT-D7700E-K) was employed for visual stimulus
presentation. Resolution was 1024 × 768 pixels covering a visual angle
of 24° horizontal by 18° vertical. Each picture in the 3 × 3 matrices, em-
ployed during the interactive phases, covered a visual angle of
3.5° × 3.5°, whereas the single pictures presented during the testing
phases covered 4.7° × 4.7°.
Ethical Statement
All procedures (including consent and participant debrieﬁng) were re-
viewed and approved by the College Ethics Committee of the Univer-
sity of Glasgow and were in full agreement with APA and BPS
guidelines, as well as with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Data Analysis
Preprocessing and statistical analysis was conducted using the Fieldtrip
Matlab® toolbox (Oostenveld et al. 2011) and was in agreement with
recently published guidelines for MEG research (Gross et al. 2012).
First, epochs were extracted from the MEG for all test phase trials from
500 ms before the picture was shown on the screen (i.e., 1300 ms
before sound onset) until 500 ms after the response. Subsequently,
linear trends were removed and all epochs were denoised to remove
signals generated by the HPI coils. Trials with very large (movement
and/or eye) artifacts were removed before PCA/ICA since this proced-
ure can be unreliable if the data contain much noise. On average, only
1 or 2 trials were removed per experimental condition at this stage
(maximally 5, no signiﬁcant differences between conditions). Then,
PCAwas used to reduce data dimensionality for each participant to 40,
60, or 100 components, which were then subjected to ICA (Oostenveld
et al. 2011; Gross et al. 2012). A higher number of components were
used if signal and noise could not be separated clearly using the lower
number of components. These components were inspected visually
and removed if they contained only noise and/or artifacts (e.g., caused
by heart beats or eye movements). The average proportion of removed
components was 0.20 (range: 0.05 to 0.37). The remainder of the com-
ponents was used to recreate the MEG signal. After that, individual
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trials with remaining artifacts were removed manually once more. This
resulted in an average of 76.1 remaining trials (range: 69–80 out of 80).
The numbers of remaining trials did not differ between the 4 condi-
tions within the same analysis (Fs > 1). To identify the same-speaker
"deliberation trials" (see ERF results below), we took all trials from the
same-speaker, precedent mismatch condition in which participants
gave a "different picture" response, plus the one-third "same picture"
responses with the longest RTs per participant. This led to an average
of 42.6 deliberation trials per participant (range: 32–66). Finally, 5 or 6
bad channels were interpolated for each participant based on the
signal of neighboring channels. These preprocessed data entered the
ERF and time-frequency (power) analyses. For coherence analysis, we
used preprocessed data without removing components via the stand-
ard PCA/ICA approach, since it has been suggested that removing ICs,
when preceded by a PCA, distorts the oscillatory phase of the signal (e.
g., Castellanos and Makarov 2006). All reported coherence effects are
relative between conditions and unlikely to be biased by artifacts (e.g.,
heart, muscles), assuming a random distribution of artifacts across
trials and conditions.
For evoked responses (ERF), trials of the same condition were aver-
aged per participant. These averages were adjusted in relation to a
baseline interval of 200 ms immediately prior to picture onset and ﬁl-
tered with a band-pass ﬁlter between 0.5 and 35 Hz. For time-
frequency representations, the power of each frequency between 2 and
30 Hz (with steps of 1 Hz) was calculated on individual trials over time
using a Hanning taper (Grandke 1983) with a window of 4 cycles
(changing in length per frequency). For both ERF and time-frequency
averages, planar gradient representations were calculated prior to
sensor-level analysis. Often it is helpful to interpret MEG ﬁelds mea-
sured by magnetometers (and axial gradiometers, e.g., Gross et al.
2012) after transforming the data to a planar gradient conﬁguration,
that is, by computing the gradient tangential to the scalp. One advan-
tage of the planar gradient transformation is that the signal amplitude
typically is largest directly above a source. This transformation is par-
ticularly helpful for sensor-level analysis as it also allows for more com-
munality across participants with the same source locations yet with
differing orientations (planar gradient represents the focus above the
location of the source and not the more orientation-dependent ﬁelds
around the source). However, for source level analysis, the original
magnetometer representation and according lead ﬁelds were em-
ployed. To test for statistically signiﬁcant differences between condi-
tions and reduce the multiple-comparison problem, we used the
cluster-based approach implemented in the Fieldtrip toolbox (Maris
and Oostenveld 2007). This robust method reduces the multiple-
comparisons problem and controls family-wise error across subjects in
time and space. To examine differences between experimental condi-
tions, paired t-tests are performed for each time-point, channel, and
frequency (for time-frequency analyses) with a threshold of P < 0.05.
Signiﬁcant clusters in time, space, and frequency are identiﬁed on the
basis of proximity (neighbors) in all dimensions of the cluster. Cluster
statistics are calculated by taking the sum of t-values in every cluster.
To obtain a P-value for each cluster, a Monte Carlo method is used to
evaluate how extreme the cluster statistics of the 2 conditions are com-
pared with random partitions of the samples. The proportion of
random partitions that results in larger cluster statistics than the ob-
served one is the P-value. The threshold was ﬁxed to P = 0.05.
We employed 2-step analyses for emulating the interaction between
2 factors in time and frequency analyses. We ﬁrst calculated a t-statistic
for the difference between 2 conditions, for example, precedent mis-
match vs. no precedent trials for each participant separately and then
included the outcomes (t-values) of this ﬁrst step statistic into a group
statistic that compared a second difference, for example, same vs. dif-
ferent speaker (note, the ﬁrst level t-statistic was calculated separately
for the same- and different-speaker condition at the individual level).
The comparison at the group level followed the robust statistics ap-
proach described earlier. The described 2-step analysis approached the
interaction between speaker (same/different) and precedent (prece-
dent mismatch/no precedent).
To identify sources underlying the sensor-level effects, individual
single-shell (Nolte 2003) head models were generated based on the in-
dividual MRI aligned with the MEG sensor array via the conducted
head digitization. Voxel size was 6 mm, and all individual head models
were normalized to a standard brain prior to analysis. ERF sources
were identiﬁed using a Linearly Constrained Minimum Variance
(LCMV) beam former (Van Veen and Buckley 1988), where we calcu-
lated a common LCMV ﬁlter for all 4 conditions (to increase SNR) per
participant. This common ﬁlter was then used to transform (“beam”)
the individual conditions into source (voxel) space for comparisons
between conditions. For identifying generators of theta oscillations, we
employed Dynamic Imaging of Coherent Sources (DICS) beam formers
(Gross et al. 2001). In this case, we were able to use condition-speciﬁc
spatial ﬁlters that could potentially reveal qualitative differences
between conditions. DICS was also employed for localizing (inter-trial)
phase-coherent sources in theta (4–6 Hz) by means of cross-spectral
density matrices in relation to particular reference signals (see Gross
et al. 2004; Kessler et al. 2006). For statistical testing of source-
localizations underlying ERF and time-frequency effects and coherent
sources, we used the same cluster-based approach, in this case only
clustering over voxels. Time windows and frequency ranges (in case of
time-frequency sources) were chosen based on signiﬁcant sensor-level
effects. Sources identiﬁed in theta-power analysis were employed as re-
ferences for theta coherence analysis. For this type of analysis, we
reduced the multiple-comparison problem by using a "false discovery
rate" (FDR) approach, since it has been suggested to be more sensitive
to spatially localized effects compared with a bias toward more wide-
spread effects in cluster-randomization (Groppe et al. 2011).
Results and Discussion
Conﬁrming the results of previous studies (Metzing and
Brennan 2003; Kronmüller and Barr 2007; Matthews et al.
2010), our behavioral results indicated that listeners experi-
enced greater confusion for precedent mismatches produced
by the same speaker as compared with those produced by a
different speaker. Figure 2 shows that both reaction times and
choices revealed an interaction between speaker (same/differ-
ent) and precedent (mismatch/no). ANOVAs conﬁrmed the
prediction of a larger precedent mismatch vs. no precedent
effect in the same speaker than the different-speaker case for
RT (longer RTs, F1,15 = 8.43, P = 0.011) and for response
choices (more "different" responses; F1,15 = 21.15, P < 0.001).
These interaction effects allowed us to speciﬁcally search for
the neural substrates involved in generating these effects. We
primarily analyzed MEG signals in the frequency domain since
this type of analysis (in contrast to averaging, i.e., ERFs) is sen-
sitive to evoked as well as to induced brain signals (e.g.,
Pfurtscheller and Lopes da Silva 1999). We found strong effects
in the theta band (4–6 Hz) that reﬂected widespread differ-
ences in cortical activity across conditions. These will be re-
ported in the next section, whereas the more conﬁned effects
in alpha (9–13 Hz) and gamma (66–78 Hz) are reported in Sup-
plementary Figure S1.
Theta Oscillatory Effects
Theta Power (Sensor and Source Space)
Analyses were time-aligned to the onset of the spoken expres-
sion, such that negative values of the time variable represent
processes taking place during the picture preview (pre-
naming), whereas positive values represent processes taking
place after onset of the verbal expression (post-naming). Con-
sistent with other studies reporting theta oscillations in the
context of episodic working memory and language processing
(e.g., Bastiaansen et al. 2002; Hagoort et al. 2004; Bastiaansen
et al. 2005; Jensen and Colgin 2007; Fuentemilla et al. 2010;
Giraud and Poeppel 2012), we found signiﬁcant modulations
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of frequencies between 4 and 6 Hz. A time-frequency analysis
at the sensor level between −800 and 1000 ms in the range of
2–30 Hz revealed a signiﬁcant cluster (P = 0.012) in the theta
range (4–6 Hz) for the precedent mismatch vs. no precedent
comparison within the same-speaker condition, in a time
window around 350–650 ms after naming onset (Fig. 3, top
row). The corresponding comparison for different speaker did
not reveal a signiﬁcant effect in theta (Fig. 3, bottom row) or any
other frequency (see Supplementary Fig. S1), corroborating the
special status of the same-speaker, precedent mismatch trials
observed in the behavioral data.
We localized the sources of the observed sensor-level theta
effect (same speaker: precedent mismatch vs. no precedent; see
Fig. 3, top row) using DICS (see Methods) collapsing over a
post-naming time window between 200 and 800 ms (to include
∼3 theta cycles) and 3 to 7 Hz. We chose these parameters
to cover the maximum of the sensor-level effects across time
samples and frequencies. The ﬁndings for the same-speaker,
Figure 2. Behavioral responses; RT (left) and choice responses (“different” or “same” picture; right). *P< 0.05; **P<0.001.
Figure 3. Time-frequency representations. Effects were found in theta (4–6 Hz) between 350 and 650 ms, only for the precedent effect within the same-speaker condition (top
row), but not within the different-speaker condition (bottom row). Colors in the topographical plots on the left indicate differences in power (precedent mismatch minus no
precedent), relative to a baseline time window (−1000 to −800 ms, just before display of the picture). Channels participating in the signiﬁcant cluster in a representative time
window (450–500 ms) are indicated by black dots. White circles indicate the channel shown in the 4 time-frequency plots on the right, showing power, relative to the baseline time
window for each of the 4 conditions. White squares indicate the location of the effect in time and frequencies. Results for alpha and gamma frequencies are reported in
Supplementary Figure S1.
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precedent effect (1 spatially distributed cluster, P = 0.028) are
shown in Figure 4, Panel A (and Supplementary Table S1,
Panel A) and revealed sources in areas that previous research
(see Introduction) has related to: (1) mentalizing (right TPJ,
ventromedial prefrontal cortex vmPFC, right PC), (2) episodic
working memory including executive function (right para-
hippocampal gyrus PHG, left lateral (lat)PFC), (3) language
(left temporal cortex TC, including left temporal pole TP), (4)
attention (right posterior parietal cortex, PPC), and (5) motor
functions (left lateral premotor and motor cortex, PMC). This
source pattern conformed very strongly to our expectations re-
garding functional processing networks interacting in the post-
naming interval (see Introduction).
In order to further strengthen our pattern of results, we con-
ducted a two-step analysis (see Methods) with the frequency
characteristics and within the time interval described earlier
in order to analyze the speaker-by-precedent interaction in
source space. This analysis revealed signiﬁcant interactions
between speaker and precedent that showed a strikingly
similar pattern (1 spatially distributed cluster, P = 0.008; Fig. 4,
Figure 4. Theta-power sources localized for the post-naming interval by means of DICS (see Methods). Sources in red show a power increase in 3–7 Hz for the same-speaker
precedent mismatch as compared with the no precedent condition (Panel A) or as a result of an interaction between speaker and precedent (Panel B). The color-coded scale
represents t-values. Labels are L for left and R for right hemisphere; SM1, primary sensori-motor cortex; PMC, premotor cortex; PPC, posterior parietal cortex; OCC, occipital cortex;
latPFC, lateral prefrontal cortex; TP, temporal pole; TC, temporal cortex; TPJ, temporo-parietal junction; PHG, parahippocampal gyrus; PC, precuneus; vmPFC, ventromedial prefrontal
cortex. Further explanations are given in the text and Supplementary Table S1.
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Panel B; Supplementary Table S1, Panel B) to that of the
simple contrast in the same-speaker condition described earlier.
Additional effects in the two-level analysis extended to the right
lateral PFC, typically associated with executive functions in
working memory. Effects also seemed to be more pronounced
and extensive in core areas around the right TPJ, PC, and
vmPFC, previously linked to mentalizing (see Introduction).
Episodic working memory in right PHG and the left latPFC also
revealed more pronounced levels of signiﬁcance in this two-step
analysis. In the left language areas, the focus of signiﬁcance was
shifted toward TP but still comprised middle TC.
Overall, the pattern across the 2 types of analysis is reassur-
ingly consistent and highlights the involvement of typical men-
talizing, episodic working memory, and language areas
(conforming to previous research, see Introduction); a pattern
that is highly speciﬁc to the same-speaker, precedent mismatch
condition and to the post-naming interval. Note that observing
the same basic pattern of theta-power effects in the interaction
as well as in the simple contrast rules out the possibility that a
negative effect for the different-speaker conditions may have
manifested as an overall positive effect compared with the
same-speaker conditions, thus, potentially driving the inter-
action effect. This is further in line with the reported sensor-
level effects (see Fig. 3), where the same-speaker, precedent
mismatch condition revealed the strongest theta-power increases.
Finally, in order to substantiate whether the sources observed
for theta power in the post-naming interval, particularly in
mentalizing areas, were indeed signiﬁcantly less active in the
pre-naming interval, we compared the 2 time periods directly
by means of another two-step analysis. For the pre-naming
interval, we chose a time window between −800 and −200 ms,
of the same length as the 200- to 800-ms post-naming interval.
The ﬁrst step comprised of comparing the precedent mismatch
to the no precedent condition for same speaker (controlling
for low-level sensory differences) both pre- and post-naming.
The pre-naming contrast was compared with the post-naming
contrast in the second step. This led to 1 positive cluster (P =
0.006), see Figure 5 (and Supplementary Table S2). The results
further corroborate our interpretation that most theta sources
observed in the previous analysis and particularly those in
typical mentalizing (and related social) areas such as TPJ, PC,
TP, and parts of the vmPFC showed signiﬁcantly stronger acti-
vation for same-speaker, precedent mismatch vs. no precedent
trials in the post-naming interval. The right PHG and bilateral
visual areas (occipital OCC) also revealed signiﬁcantly stronger
theta power for this comparison in the post-naming interval.
Based on the existing literature (see Introduction), this sug-
gests stronger episodic retrieval in the right hemisphere along
with stronger visual processing in response to the naming mis-
match. Left TC activation could indicate that a mismatch with
an anticipated precedent (as compared with just hearing a new
name without any precedent) may have led to more prominent
language area activation than building up anticipation for a
certain term pre-naming. As a form of "reality check," left
motor areas (MC) also showed up in this analysis. This was ex-
pected because no difference in motor response should be
present pre-naming, whereas after naming, response process-
ing was stronger for precedent mismatch than for no precedent
trials.
Theta Phase-Coherence (Source-Space)
To obtain a picture of the functional connectivity between
these various brain areas, we analyzed phase-coherence in the
4–6 Hz band between 200 and 800 ms post-naming (see
Methods). We contrasted precedent mismatch and no prece-
dent conditions for the same speaker to identify cortical areas
that revealed coherence differences relative to a particular ref-
erence site. The overall pattern of coherence is shown in detail
in Figure 6 (and Supplementary Table S3) and reveals function-
al connectivity effects (statistical maps of signiﬁcant theta
phase-coherence effects) in relation to “seed” areas (reference
sites) taken from the previous theta-power source analyses.
Red color denotes areas that are coupled signiﬁcantly stronger
with the respective seed area in the mismatch compared with
the no-precedent condition (mismatch > no precedent), whereas
blue color denotes the reverse effect (mismatch < no precedent).
Figure 5. Theta-power sources before and after naming, localized by means of DICS (see Methods). Sources in red show a power increase in 3–7 Hz for contrasting same-speaker,
precedent mismatch vs. same-speaker, no precedent in the post-naming interval compared with the same contrast in the pre-naming interval. Within the same-speaker condition,
we compared precedent mismatch vs. no precedent conditions separately for the post- and the pre-naming intervals and for each participant (ﬁrst step) and then employed a
group-level statistic (second step) for comparing the 2 intervals. The color-coded scale represents t-values. For source labels, see Figure 4. Further source details are reported in
Supplementary Table S2.
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Left TP and left TC were coupled to left PHG and left/right
latPFC, and to vmPFC, which we interpret based on the exist-
ing literature (see Introduction) as the functional coupling
between subnetworks related to language, episodic working
memory, and mentalizing. This functional interpretation is
further corroborated by the statistically signiﬁcant coupling
between right PHG and areas in latPFC, mTC, and left TPJ.
Caudal anterior cingulate cortex has been related to conﬂict
monitoring, and the currently observed coupling with tem-
poral cortex could reﬂect conﬂict resolution between current
and retrieved naming.
Importantly, when using the right TPJ as a reference site, we
found the left vmPFC cortex to be signiﬁcantly more coherent
(mismatch > no precedent). This corroborates the notion that
information exchange within the mentalizing network was
engaged more strongly for precedent mismatch trials by the
same speaker compared with when no precedent had been es-
tablished during the interaction. In addition, and somewhat
surprisingly, signiﬁcantly less coherence (mismatch < no pre-
cedent) was found in relation to right middle TC and to right
PMC. Reduced theta phase-coherence in mismatch compared
with the no precedent condition could suggest active decoup-
ling between 2 areas and could reﬂect suppression (e.g., Gross
et al. 2004). The present result could be interpreted as TPJ sup-
pressing predictions that were generated by the right hemisphere
(particularly TC) during the pre-naming interval (e.g.,
Gardner et al. 1983; Marini et al. 2005; Federmeier 2007 for
review; Tourville and Guenther 2011). While this remains
speculative because coherence is a correlative measure that
does not allow inferring a direction of inﬂuence, the right
middle TC also reveals a similar pattern of decoupling in rela-
tion to the left lateral PFC (Fig. 6), supporting the notion of
top-down suppression of a “wrong” linguistic prediction after
the same speaker used a term that mismatched with the ex-
pected precedent.
Analysis of “Same-Speaker Deliberation” Trials
So far, the results reported for the oscillatory domain have re-
vealed stronger theta activity in the post-naming interval for
same-speaker, precedent mismatch trials as compared with no
precedent trials, but no signiﬁcant differences at all were ob-
served in the pre-naming interval and a direct (theta power) com-
parison showed that the post-naming effects were signiﬁcantly
stronger compared with pre-naming. Importantly, the post-
naming effects in theta-power and -coherence have included
areas and their coupling, which previous research has identiﬁed
as core mentalizing areas (see Introduction). The results so far,
therefore, support the notion of “on-demand” involvement of
perspective taking and mentalizing in language processing.
However, it might be difﬁcult for slow theta effects to reach
signiﬁcance in the relatively short (800 ms) pre-naming inter-
val. Furthermore, to the extent that mentalizing might be
taking place equally across all conditions, speciﬁcally in the
Figure 6. Theta phase-coherence (4–6 Hz) localized for the post-naming interval by means of DICS (see Methods). Differences in coherent sources between same-speaker,
precedent mismatch minus same-speaker, no precedent (FDR-corrected signiﬁcant t-values) in reference to theta-power sources in latPFC, left TP, left mTC, right PHG, and right TPJ
as identiﬁed in the reported power analyses (see Fig. 4). The color-coded scale represents t-values. New source labels in this ﬁgure are ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; SMA,
supplementary motor area. For all other source labels, see Figure 4. Red-yellow sources denote stronger coherence in the same-speaker, precedent mismatch compared with the
same-speaker, no precedent condition, whereas blue sources denote the opposite effect. Further explanations in the text and Supplementary Table S3.
3228 MEG Reveals Role of Mentalizing in Conversation • Bögels et al.
 at A
ston U
niversity on Septem
ber 7, 2015
http://cercor.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
pre-naming interval, these networks might not show up in any
cross-condition comparisons. Although this seems unlikely,
given the robust mentalizing differences observed in the post-
naming interval, we made a ﬁnal attempt to identify anticipa-
tory brain activity in general and activity that could be related
to mentalizing in particular. To create the best opportunity for
ﬁnding mentalizing effects, we speciﬁcally targeted those trials
within the same-speaker, precedent mismatch condition in
which the behavioral evidence suggested engagement of men-
talizing processes, either through a “different picture” response
or through a “same picture” response with a particularly slow re-
sponse time (see Methods for details). As these are trials where
some sort of deliberation has evidently occurred, we refer to
these particular trials as "same-speaker deliberation trials." We
compared these trials again to the same-speaker, no precedent
trials, yet by selecting this subset with the highest probability of
deliberation, conform to our behavioral indicators, any activa-
tion of mentalizing networks in the pre-naming interval that
may have occurred should now become apparent.
Note that pre-selecting these trials is especially favorable
toward a central, anticipatory view of mentalizing and works
against more “on-demand,” egocentric accounts. If participants
give a "different picture" response, they show evidence that
they took the perspective of the speaker and noted that she
probably sees a different picture if using a different name than
before. Slow responses at least indicate that participants prob-
ably did not expect this name, possibly because they used
mentalizing to anticipate a certain name. Hence, if even this
subset of trials does not support anticipatory mentalizing activ-
ity in the pre-naming interval, this would provide a strong
argument against the idea that listeners use mentalizing spon-
taneously to generate speaker-speciﬁc linguistic predictions.
Deliberative trial selection was applied separately for time- and
frequency-data, yet only evoked responses in the time-domain
(ERF; cf. ERP) revealed signiﬁcant anticipatory effects in the
pre-naming interval (Fig. 7). Complete ERF results are reported
in Supplementary Figure S2.
ERF Analysis of Same-Speaker Deliberation Trials (Sensor and
Source Space)
Focusing on same-speaker deliberation trials, as compared
with the same-speaker, no-precedent trials, we found 3
signiﬁcant clusters between −800 and 1000 ms. Suggesting
anticipatory processing, 2 were in the pre-naming preview
phase; 1 between −550 and −23 ms (P = 0.004), 1 between −306
and 0 ms (P = 0.004) and both with a predominantly right-
hemisphere topography (Fig. 7, left; Fig. 8, Panel A). One cluster
(P < 0.00001) lasted between 67 and 680 ms after naming, with a
maximum amount of signiﬁcant channels around 400 ms and a
predominantly left-hemisphere topography (Fig. 7, right; Fig. 8,
Panel B). Source analysis was then employed for both the pre-
and post-naming interval to examine whether the anticipatory
clusters involved mentalizing in addition to episodic retrieval.
In the early interval, a time window between −350 and
−150 ms (before naming onset) was centered on the peak of
the sensor-level effect, and 1 signiﬁcant, spatially distributed
cluster was found (P < 0.00001). For LCMV beam former ana-
lysis of the post-naming interval, a time window between 300
and 500 ms was centered on the peak of the effect at sensor
level and another signiﬁcant, spatially distributed cluster was
found (P < 0.00001). Conforming to the topography shown in
Figure 7 (left), sources for the pre-naming interval were
located predominantly in the right hemisphere (see Fig. 8,
Panel A, and Supplementary Table S4, Panel A). Sources com-
prised areas typically associated (see Introduction) with epi-
sodic working memory (right dlPFC, ACC, left PHG), language
(right mTC), and visual processing (left occipital temporal
cortex OTC, left parieto-occipital cortex POC, right OCC). In
contrast, no clear mentalizing activation could be identiﬁed ac-
cording to the typical areas reported in the literature and re-
viewed in Introduction. This pattern of results is in agreement
with egocentric processing, rather than partner-oriented antici-
pation (see Introduction). PHG involvement in particular sug-
gests that participants retrieved the episodic context associated
with the speciﬁc target object they were viewing. Differences
in visual areas further support the notion that episodic retrieval
of previously named objects was more visually detailed. PHG
might therefore play an anticipatory role in conjunction with
dlPFC for retrieving the episodic context of the interaction
with the target object, including information about the speaker
and the used name—prior to the current naming of the object
(e.g., Imaizumi et al. 1997; Epstein and Kanwisher 1998; Olson
et al. 2006; Rankin et al. 2009). The latter is in agreement with
the observed effects in typical language-related areas of the
Figure 7. Sensor-level ERF effects. Sensor-level ERF comparisons for same-speaker deliberation trials (dotted dark blue line) compared with the same-speaker, no precedent trials
(light blue line). Black asterisks indicate channels participating in signiﬁcant clusters for this contrast in a representative time window. Two different time windows are shown:
left = pre-naming; right = post-naming. The solid dark blue line representing all same-speaker, precedent mismatch trials is added for comparison. See also Supplementary
Figure S2 for all sensor-level ERF results.
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middle TC in the right hemisphere, possibly indicating antici-
pation of the name previously associated with the picture
during interaction (e.g., Gardner et al. 1983; Marini et al. 2005;
Federmeier 2007; Tourville and Guenther 2011). Effects in
ACC are compatible with the notion of anticipation of cognitive
effort or conﬂict (Sohn et al. 2007; Aarts et al. 2008). Due to
the substantial amount of precedent mismatch trials (see
Table 1), participants may have learned to anticipate conﬂict
Figure 8. Signiﬁcant sources for deliberation trials vs. no precedent (same speaker) using LCMV beam formers (see Methods). Panel A shows sources for the pre-naming interval
(together with the corresponding ERF topography from Fig. 7, left). Panel B shows the sources for the late interval (ERF topography from Fig. 7, right). The color-coded scale
represents t-values. Source labels do not conform to Figures 4 and 6 apart from POC, parieto-occipital cortex; OTC, occipito-temporal cortex; vlPFC, ventro-lateral prefrontal cortex.
Further explanations are in the text and in Supplementary Table S4.
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with the linguistic predictions they generated based on their
previous interaction.
While we found evidence that speaker-speciﬁc predictions
were generated based on episodic retrieval, it is doubtful
whether this activation reﬂects common ground processing or
merely context-speciﬁc retrieval (see Introduction). Given the
lack of evidence for a difference in activation of TPJ and other
mentalizing areas reported in the current literature (see Intro-
duction) between same-speaker deliberation and no precedent
trials in this pre-naming period, we must conclude that the
overall picture of results is consistent with the general idea that
communicatively relevant, partner-speciﬁc information can be
activated through basic memory processes without mediation
by access to common ground in terms of active co-representation
of the other’s mental states (Horton and Gerrig 2005; Barr et al.
2014).
Sources for the post-naming interval were predominantly
left lateralized (Fig. 8, Panel B, and Supplementary Table S4,
Panel B) in concordance with the sensor topography of the
ERF effects (Fig. 7, right). Effects in typical motor/premotor
areas (PMC) might reﬂect more intense or more conﬂicting
motor preparation that would ﬁt with ACC involvement, which
has been linked to conﬂict monitoring as well as anticipation
(Sohn et al. 2007). PHG also seemed to be involved in both in-
tervals (and across all types of analysis), possibly suggesting
that episodic retrieval efforts may have been continuously
engaged more strongly in deliberation trials. This is of particu-
lar interest in the context of mentalizing effects in left TPJ and
vmPFC only “after” naming. Samson et al. (2004) pointed out
the particular relevance of the left TPJ for reasoning about
others’ beliefs, which in the present context only seemed to be
engaged “on-demand,” when mentalizing was required to
resolve a conﬂict.
Relating ERF and Theta Results
The pattern observed in the ERF analysis of same-speaker de-
liberation trials complements and corroborates our results
based on theta power and phase-coherence. So far, a few of
the sources had only been reported in theta phase-coherence
analysis. These have now been conﬁrmed in the ERF analysis
of deliberation trials: left PHG, left TPJ, caudal ACC, right PMC,
and right middle TC (see Figs 6 and 8). Importantly, however,
potential mentalizing in the left TPJ was only conﬁrmed for the
post-naming interval (see ERF and coherence analyses). Fur-
thermore, an area in the right middle TC that was most likely
associated with linguistic predictions in the pre-naming inter-
val (ERF analysis) revealed de-coupling of theta phase during
the post-naming interval in relation to left lateral PFC and right
TPJ (Fig. 6). This corroborates the proposed notion (see
Section on theta phase-coherence) that “wrong” linguistic pre-
dictions might be suppressed when common ground is rees-
tablished, that is, when an apparent precedent violation is
resolved via mentalizing.
Although our results consistently show activation of areas
previously related to mentalizing processes in the post-naming,
but not the pre-naming interval, 2 potential concerns could be
raised. First, areas such as the TPJ, vmPFC, and precuneus have
reliably been related to mentalizing activities but could possibly
also reﬂect other functions as well, since many brain areas par-
ticipate in more than one cognitive activity. Next to mentalizing,
the TPJ, for example, has been related to reorienting of atten-
tion to an unexpected stimulus (e.g., Corbetta and Shulman
2002; Mars et al. 2012). In the context of the present paradigm,
a mismatching name might be considered an unexpected
stimulus, because participants anticipate the previously men-
tioned name based on memory retrieval of the picture and its
context. Insofar as the expectation for a certain name is stronger
in the same-speaker condition (because of a tighter contextual
similarity), the unexpectedness of the mismatch might be most
prominent in the same-speaker, mismatch condition and there-
fore lead to the strongest TPJ response in that condition. It is
difﬁcult to rule out such an alternative explanation directly.
However, we found both right and left TPJ to be involved
across different analyses. Also, our theta phase-coherence
results revealed a coupling between the right TPJ and the left
vmPFC, 2 areas that have been strongly associated with the
mentalizing network and their direct functional coupling is
harder to reconcile with a stimulus expectancy account than
with a mentalizing account (see also Mars et al. 2012). Neverthe-
less, further converging research, using similar paradigms, will
be necessary to completely rule out alternative explanations and
support our interpretation that more extensive mentalizing is re-
quired in response to experimental conditions such as the current
same-speaker, mismatch condition. For example, an fMRI study,
because of its better spatial resolution, could pinpoint more spe-
ciﬁcally the part of the TPJ involved, allowing for more precise
functional interpretations (see, e.g., Mars et al. 2012). Alas, such
an approach would not be able to corroborate our ﬁndings in
terms of “when”mentalizing is engaged.
A further caveat concerns the fact that no differences in men-
talizing areas were found in the pre-naming interval. This is in
some aspects a null result, which should be interpreted with
care and needs to be replicated by future studies. However,
our direct comparison of theta power between the pre- and
post-naming interval revealed that most effects (including TPJ)
reported for the post-naming interval were signiﬁcantly stron-
ger compared with pre-naming, which corroborates our
current interpretation. Finally, in our ERF analysis of deliber-
ation trials, an extensive network of areas (typically related to
episodic memory and language in previous research) was
found to be activated in the pre-naming period, showing that
our analysis was sensitive and powerful enough to pick up on
differences between the conditions in that interval. Still, no
typical mentalizing area such as TPJ was involved in this
pattern, further corroborating our conclusion that these areas
do not appear to be involved in anticipatory processing.
General Discussion
Our results indicate that brain areas typically related to lan-
guage, vision, episodic working memory, and mentalizing in
previous research are dynamically and jointly involved in en-
countering and resolving conﬂict after encountering a refer-
ence that mismatches with a previously negotiated precedent
by the same speaker. The reported effects on behavior, evoked
responses, oscillations, and sources were most pronounced
when the mismatch occurred with respect to a precedent estab-
lished by the same speaker, compared with processing of trials
without a precedent or when the precedent had been estab-
lished by a different speaker. It is important to note that the
paradigm employed here was special in making the speaker’s
identity known to the listener before each block of test trials,
thus giving ample opportunity for listeners to mentalize and
access common ground to enhance speaker-speciﬁc linguistic
predictions.
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The dynamics of theta oscillations, sources, phase cou-
plings, and evoked responses are fundamentally novel ﬁndings
in themselves and overall have consistently revealed that listen-
ers do access common ground previously established with a
speciﬁc speaker (but not another speaker) and that these pro-
cesses seem to involve speaker-speciﬁc episodic retrieval as
well as mentalizing. These ﬁndings are compatible with most
behavioral experiments showing partner-speciﬁc processing
of referential precedents. However, the results across several,
very different analysis approaches in source space (theta-
power, -coherence, ERF) also shed light on the mechanisms
that are engaged in anticipation of an upcoming linguistic ref-
erence in contrast to those mechanisms that are engaged in re-
action to an apparent pragmatic violation of previously
established common ground. Overall, we found more robust
mentalizing effects (evoked and oscillatory theta activity) in
the post-naming interval, suggesting that on a majority of
trials, participants engaged in enhanced episodic retrieval and,
most importantly, mentalizing in response to a perceived viola-
tion.
Only when focusing on those trials where mentalizing was
most likely to occur—that is, same-speaker deliberation trials—
did we ﬁnd anticipatory (pre-naming) evoked activity (ERF
analysis), but this was only for brain areas typically linked to
episodic retrieval, linguistic predictions, and conﬂict anti-
cipation, and not for areas typically involved in mentalizing.
Importantly, episodic recall of speaker-speciﬁc representations
is not identical to common ground, as episodic representations
can be shared without also being known to be shared (Shintel
and Keysar 2007). That is, representations may become acti-
vated via the basic memory retrieval principle of encoding spe-
ciﬁcity rather than through any process that genuinely reﬂects
processing of the speaker’s experience, such as produced by
mentalizing (Barr et al. 2014).
It is important to emphasize that selecting this particular
subset of same-speaker deliberation trials was most favorable
for ﬁnding anticipatory mentalizing activity; if these trials do
not show anticipation of the speaker’s mental states in the TPJ
that has been primarily associated with perspective taking,
then no other trial type is more likely to do so. Thus, looking
back at the 2 accounts we contrasted in Introduction, the
results of our analyses support the conclusion that anticipating
speciﬁc speakers’ referential behavior based on mentalizing in
relation to previously established common ground may not be
a spontaneous, default process. In contrast, the default process
seems to be more egocentric with anticipation only relying on
episodic retrieval of visual and linguistic associations without
any inference of the speaker’s current mental states. The latter
appears to be mainly engaged "on demand" once a pragmatic
violation has been established and a deliberate decision has
been made to account for it. Moreover, this evidence suggest-
ing on-demand engagement of mentalizing has been obtained
in the ecologically valid context of a realistic communicative
interaction with live interlocutors.
Although the pattern of results was reassuringly consistent
across our varied analyses, it is important to point out once
again that the segregation of functional brain modules and the
links between brain areas and function are based on the
current state of the literature and must therefore be regarded as
hypothetical and exploratory at the current stage. Future
studies are necessary to corroborate these ﬁndings, yet we
believe that the current results and interpretations will provide
valuable constraints and hypotheses for future research. It
should also be noted that our results were obtained with a
novel, socially interactive paradigm that is quite different from
most neurocognitive paradigms employed to date, which
means that there is no clear evidentiary basis on which we
could have generated more conﬁrmatory-style predictions.
Therefore, future research is needed to conﬁrm the results of
the present study, using similar or even more realistic para-
digms. Further research is also needed to establish the general-
ity of these results beyond the communicative scenario that we
have investigated. It could well be the case that in certain scen-
arios mentalizing is indeed engaged more spontaneously, for
example, in conversation with children who are not expected
to adhere to common ground or to be able to fully engage in
mentalizing themselves. Finally, compared with natural con-
versation, the present study still used a somewhat repetitive
task, which was necessary at the current stage of our research
for maintaining sufﬁcient experimental control and statistical
power. Still, the interactive nature of the paradigm should have
been sufﬁcient to have motivated participants to remain
focused throughout the experiment. Our study could be a step-
ping stone toward even more naturalism, along a path that
might eventually allow neuroimaging to tackle the unre-
strained nature of real conversation.
Conclusions
In the current MEG study, we employed an innovative experi-
mental paradigm that combined an initial phase of live conver-
sational interaction with a confederate speaker and a
subsequent test phase of prerecorded speech from either the
same or another speaker. Naturalistic negotiation of referential
precedents in the interactive phase was sometimes followed by
a referential mismatch in the test phase. The critical condition
was when the same speaker produced a mismatch, requiring
participants to engage in mentalizing in order to judge
whether the speaker was still referring to the same object.
Based on a substantial body of previous research relating
speciﬁc cognitive functions to certain brain areas, our results
for theta oscillations, theta sources, theta phase couplings and
evoked responses consistently indicate that brain areas typical-
ly involved in language, vision, episodic working memory and
mentalizing were dynamically and jointly involved in resolving
conﬂict after encountering a mismatching reference by the
same speaker (but not another speaker). However, we found
more robust mentalizing effects in the post-naming than in the
pre-naming interval, suggesting that on a majority of trials, par-
ticipants engaged in mentalizing only in response to a per-
ceived violation. Only when focusing on those trials where
mentalizing was most likely to occur did we ﬁnd any anticipa-
tory (pre-naming) activity, but this activity was conﬁned to
brain areas typically linked to episodic retrieval, linguistic pre-
dictions, and conﬂict anticipation, and did not include areas
typically involved in mentalizing. Importantly, episodic recall
of speaker-speciﬁc representations is not identical to common
ground, as episodic representations can be shared without also
being known to be shared (Shintel and Keysar 2007).
In conclusion, default processing of utterances that violate
common ground seems to be quite egocentric at ﬁrst, with
anticipation relying primarily on episodic retrieval of visual and
linguistic associations without any inference about the speaker’s
current mental states. The latter appears to be mainly engaged
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"on demand" once a pragmatic violation has been established
and a deliberate decision has been made to account for it.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material can be found at: http://www.cercor.oxford
journals.org/.
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